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Rites and Rights in
Afghanistan: The Hazara
and the 2004 Constitution
JUSTIN DESAUTELS-STEIN'
INTRODUCTION
It seems rather natural to respond with ambivalence to the news of
Afghanistan's recent foray into constitution-making. On the one hand, the emer-
gence of a national charter allegiant to the United Nations, international law, and
the promotion of women's rights makes for a hopeful optimism. 2 Perhaps after
decades of near-constant warfare and centuries of intermittent ethnic strife,
Afghanistan is finally turning a rough and ugly corner towards a genuinely self-
determined democratic prosperity. What the United States has done in
Afghanistan, according to Donald Rumsfeld, is a "breath-taking accomplish-
ment."3 On the other hand, 2004 marked the arrival of Afghanistan's sixth con-
stitution since 1923. This less than encouraging track record includes attempts
from agents at various ends of the political spectrum to consolidate what many
scholars have cited as being amongst the world's most ethnically fragmented
states.' Given this past and what was effectively the imposition of an American-
styled constitutional order in the wake of a post-September 11 American inva-
sion, a so-called realism might predict a quick and unavoidable collapse." In this
view, the situation is hardly promising-it is frustrating, if not frightening.
This article is agnostic with respect to the normative stakes in
Afghanistan's "breath-taking accomplishment." Part Two instead focuses on the
plight of one of Afghanistan's less fortunate ethnic groups: the Hazara. The
Hazara possess unique ethnic physiognomy and status as Shi'i in a predominantly
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Sunni Muslim country, making them perennial losers in the struggle for ethnic
and sectarian parity. The 1990s saw an increasingly vocal maturation on the part
of the Hazara through their political party, Hizb-i-Wahdat, and their increasing
interest in achieving greater guarantees of legal rights and religious freedom. Part
Three examines Afghanistan's 2004 Constitution, exploring both the sectarian
and multicultural dimensions. It seeks to determine whether Hazara claims with
respect to religious freedoms and ethnic parity have been met.
Part Four shifts from the doctrinal to the theoretical, teasing out the
Islamic and liberal-democratic strands that blend in the new constitution. Its suc-
cess or failure will likely turn on a number of political variables, and this part
picks up on two of them. The first variable is Islamic constitutionalism: Islam has
been criticized for being unable to meet the standards of liberal democracy, such
as its requirement of state neutrality. Without joining the much larger debate on
Islam and human rights generally, the question considered here will be whether
the traditional complaint about state neutrality in Islamic governance holds
water. The second variable is the relationship between Islamic law and minority
rights. Afghanistan has a significant history of ethnic and sectarian strife and sub-
sequently requires a legal system tuned to this heritage. When it comes to pro-
tecting minority rights, is Islamic law simply a bad idea? If not, is liberalism? This
article concludes that the Constitution of 2004, while arguably better for the
Hazara in terms of sectarian rights, does not go far enough in terms of bridging
potentially volatile ethnic tensions. At the same time, however, it seems prema-
ture to assume constitutional collapse due to its heavy Islamic influence.
AFGHANISTAN'S HAZARAi A TROUBLED HISTORY
The Ethnic Landscape
Afghanistan has been called a "Nation of Minorities,"7 and for good
reason. Comprised of several ethnic groups-none of which constitute a major-
ity of the population-Afghanistan has a history of segmented societies never
having congealed into a unified nation-state.8 The largest of these groups is the
Pashtun, who predominate in the eastern and southern portions of the country
adjacent to Pakistan, which includes the cities of Kandahar and Jalalabad.
Pashtuns, comprising 38 percent of the total population, have traditionally held
the dominant position in the state.' The Pashtuns have a customary code called
Pashtunwali,"° which serves-in conjunction with their Hanafi brand of Sunni
Islam-as their standard for personal, social, and religious rectitude." Tajiks, the
second largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, comprise about 25 percent of the
country's population and are concentrated in the northeast across from
Tajikistan. Most Tajiks also belong to the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam, though
some Shi'i Tajiks live in the west close to Herat. Hazaras form 19 percent of the
VOL.29:1 WINTER 2005
RITES AND RIGHTS IN AFGHANISTAN:
THE HAZARA AND THE 2004 CONSTITUTION
population and constitute the bulk of the Shi'i minority in Afghanistan. The
Hazara are primarily found in the landlocked central highlands, known as the
Hazarajat. The remainder of the population is largely Uzbek and Turkmen, who
together constitute close to 20 percent and live in the north adjacent to their
respective states, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. They are also Hanafite Sunnis
and are ethnically and linguistically Turkic. All in all, Afghanistan is almost
exclusively Muslim, with close to 80 percent of the population subscribing to
Hanafi Sunnism.
Afghanistan's largely arbitrary borders, first determined by the British and
Russians in the nineteenth century, have separated many of Afghanistan's ethnic
groups from fellow brethren in neighboring states. This is evidenced in the large
numbers of Pashtun in Pakistan and Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Turkmen in their home
states across the border. Unique in this respect, however, are the Hazara, isolated
from a "complementary" ethnicity in a neighboring state.' 2 Clearly not limited to
the Afghan context, the arbitrary separation of ethnic groups is nonetheless a
prominent one, the impact of which is considerably felt in the present day.
The Hazara
The origins of the Hazaras are a mystery."3 A source for queries is the fact that
Hazaras are physically distinctive from the other ethnic groups in Afghanistan.
With round faces and wide noses, it has been popularly believed that the Hazaras
are the descendants of Genghis Khan's Mongol armies. This idea, though widely
discredited, has given way to general theories that suggest that Hazaras are likely
one of the oldest inhabitants of the region and a blend of Mongol, Turkic, and
Persian genealogy. 4 Regardless of their origins, the Hazara phenotype has had a
powerful influence on their collective identity. Having been subject to historical
persecution, and having lived largely in a geographically isolated region, the physi-
cality of the Hazaras has provided an easy means by which other groups can iden-
tify and stigmatize the Hazara people. This distinctiveness has also had the effect of
making it increasingly difficult for Hazaras to assimilate into majority cultures,
either voluntarily or by force. As for religion, Hazaras are Shi'a, unlike the Sunni
majority in the rest of the country. 5 A common explanation for the occurrence of
Shi'ism in the Hazarajat is that it was introduced by the Safavids of Persia in the
sixteenth century. Another explanation posits that the Hazara converted upon fol-
lowing the influences of Ghazan Khan and Abu Sa'id, who came to Shi'ism in the
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, respectively. In either case, it is clear that
Shi'ism did not experience the grassroots support enjoyed by Sunni Islam and only
came into favor at the behest of foreign interventions. 6
The baseline for understanding the contemporary condition of the Hazaras
in Afghanistan is the kingship of Amir Abdul Rahman. 7 Coming into power in
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1880, Abdul Rahman sought to establish an Afghan state forged on the European
nation-state model,"5 which meant unifying the groups within Afghanistan's
emerging borders, including the traditionally independent Hazara." Abdul
Rahman's task of subjugating the Hazara was a difficult one. In a biography, he
is quoted as saying that "the Hazaras had raided and plundered the neighboring
subjects [of the Afghan confederacy] for about three hundred years past, and
none of the kings had had the power to make them absolutely peaceful."2 ° Abdul
Rahman's "pacification" of the Hazara during his nation-building campaign in
the late 1880s quickly turned violent, erupting into large-scale rebellions and an
eventual Hazara "war of independence."2
Abdul Rahman's war on the Hazara had tremendous consequences for
their future in Afghanistan's muddled ethno-religious relations. Shrewdly manip-
ulating both sectarian and ethnic sentiments, Rahman was able to piece together
a coalition aimed at either assimilating or removing the Hazara from his nascent,
Pashtun-dominated state.22 To do this, he mobilized the chief Sunni clerics in
Kabul who subsequently issued a declaration against the Shi'i Hazara, declaring
them to be kafir (infidels). As Asta Oleson has reported, the Sunni position was
that the "people of the Hazara tribe, being Shi'a, should not be considered
Muslims and should not be left alive, wherever they might be found."23 Inspired
by the religious compulsion ofjihad, as well as the plunder and slaves promised
by subjugation of the Hazarajat, thousands of volunteers joined the battles, which
would eventually crush the Hazara independence movement.24
The confluence of sectarian peculiarity and ethnic abstruseness has dealt
the Hazaras an unfortunate blow amidst the segmented dynamics of Afghan soci-
ety. Some writers have suggested that social demarcations in Afghanistan for the
Hazaras have been so severe as to approximate a caste system, with the Hazaras
occupying the lowest realm.25 As one scholar on minority rights in Afghanistan
has written, "Since their subjugation by Amir Abdul Rahman Khan and the
resulting inclusion in the Afghan state in the late nineteenth century, the Hazara
have faced slavery, taxation without representation, exploitation of their natural
resources, and chronic economic underdevelopment."26 The Hazaras have found
themselves constrained in a class hierarchy-very much due to the lack of ade-
quate educational resources-in which they typically fill the most menial occu-
pations. A common insult for Hazaras is "porter" or "sweeper," referring to the
type of job many Afghans believe to be most fitting for the Hazaras. Indeed,
Hazaras outside of the Hazarajat are habitually employed as menial laborers,
almost never attaining managerial positions beyond their "class." The rampant
educational deficit among the Hazara has extended into religious areas as well,
where Shi'i clerics are few and far between in the Hazarajat. All in all, the Hazara
resources, both human and natural, have been among the most underdeveloped
in all of undeveloped Afghanistan.
2 7
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THE 2004 CONSTITUTION
With this history in mind, it is necessary to address two types of questions: (1)
How have Islam and liberal democracy managed to merge under the new constitu-
tion in Afghanistan? (2) How will the new constitution serve minority interests? The
2004 Constitution was mandated by the Bonn Agreement, which was signed shortly
after the fall of the Taliban government in 2001. Among other things, the Bonn
Agreement stipulated that a new constitution would be enacted according to a spe-
cific schedule that began when then-interim President Hamid Karzai appointed a
Constitutional (D rafting) Commission in .......... ......................... ............................
October 2002. A Constitutional Review
Commission was then set up in April 2003, Afghanistan has taken clear
which, in conjunction with the United steps towards entrenching
Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan Islam in its constitution.
(UNAMA), went about educating the public
on the first draft. In December 2003, the final
constitutional draft was presented to a 500-member loyajirga (grand council). After
much wrangling and controversy as to which government officials were to be
appointed or elected, and how, the constitution was approved on January 4, 2004.
Ten days later, President Karzai signed it into law.
In substance, the new constitution used as a benchmark the somewhat lib-
eral Constitution of 1964 established during Zahir Shah's ill-fated "New
Democracy" movement. This pleased the international community, which felt it
especially important that the new constitutional order be committed to free elec-
tions, respect for human rights, and basic social justice. At the same time,
Afghanistan has taken clear steps toward entrenching Islam in its constitution.
From the Hazara perspective, a more important question was how the pro-
visions in the 1964 Constitution specifying Hanafi fiqh (the rules governing the
personal relations of Muslims) would be amended to allow for greater sectarian
freedom within the limits of greater Islam. Of course, this issue implicates the
broader problems of innovation and dissent within the Islamic community-an issue
of serious difficulty. Nonetheless, the Hazara sought self-validation through the
elimination of the Hanafi references in the constitution and a new parity between
the various madhaab (schools of legal interpretation). One might wonder why the
Hazara would not be content with the more palpable claims for greater rights in
Afghanistan, leaving well enough alone with respect to constitutional provisions
marking Hanafi rites as the official national rites. Part of the answer surely has to
do with the long history of sectarian violence in Afghanistan. For many years Shi'a
were barred from practicing seemingly simple religious rites, and to the extent that
present provisions tread on traditionally touchy territory, the Hazara insistence on
ritualistic parity for theirfiqh might be viewed as an identity claim.28
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Islamic Democracy?
The 1964 Constitution and the Afghan civil and criminal codes were
"Hanafized." 29 This is to say that Hanafi doctrine was threaded through Afghan
constitutional and statutory law, providing either the explicit standard by which
the rule was to be laid down, or the background trumping mechanism. For exam-
ple, Article 2 of the 1964 Constitution reads: "Islam is the sacred religion of
Afghanistan. Religious rites performed by the state shall be according to the pro-
visions of the Hanafi doctrine. Non-Muslims shall be free to perform their ritu-
als within the limits determined by laws for public decency and public peace."
Similarly, Article 8 required the King to be Muslim and a follower of the Hanafi
school; Article 64 required no law "repugnant to the basic principles of the sacred
religion of Islam;" Article 69 provided that in areas where there was a gap in the
law, "Hanafi jurisprudence of the Sharia" would fill the space; and Article 102
read, "Whenever no constitutional or statutory provisions are available, courts are
obliged to follow the basic principles of Hanafi jurisprudence of the Shari'aat
(ordinances given in the Qu'ran) in order to render a decision that in their opin-
ion secures justice in the nest possible way."
The 2004 Constitution has a strong Islamic influence, but is less Hanafi-
centric than its predecessor. Chapter One, concerning the State, unabashedly
proclaims Islam to be the sacred religion of Afghanistan,3" which itself is declared
to be an Islamic Republic." Article 3 invokes the trump language of the old
Article 64, flatly stating, "no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of
the sacred religion of Islam." Additional references to Islam include a mandate
that all educational curriculum be based not only on academic principles but also
on Islamic principles and national culture, and that the curriculum of religious
subjects be based on the Islamic sects existing in Afghanistan (Article 45); state
adoption of measures necessary to ensure physical and psychological well-being
of the family, such as the elimination of traditions contrary to the principles of
Islam (Article 54); and numerous oaths required of elected and appointed offi-
cials to obey and safeguard the principles of Islam (Articles 63, 74, and 119).
Shari'a may be less prominent in the 2004 Constitution than it was in 1964, but
it is not entirely absent. Article 130 resuscitates the previous Article 102, where
Hanafi jurisprudence is to act as a gap-filler whenever constitutional and statu-
tory provisions do not adequately supply courts with a remedy. Of note, how-
ever, is the subsequent Article 131, which allows for Shi'i jurisprudence to be
applied in "personal matters" involving Shi'i claimants and the general govern-
ability of Shi'i law in cases where both claimants are Shi'a and no constitutional
or statutory provisions are otherwise applicable. The coup degrace is Article 149:
"The provisions of adherence to the fundamentals of the sacred religion of Islam
and the regime of the Islamic Republic cannot be amended."
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The 2004 edition is not only less Hanafized than its 1964 predecessor, it
is also more liberal. To be sure, the 1964 Constitution had a number of liberal
components, with a fair amount of prescribed rights and freedoms. Afghanistan's
2004 Constitution, however-like many established in the late twentieth cen-
tury-goes beyond the U.S. Constitution in its rights, commitments, and plans
for social justice. Article 4 establishes a general equality among the various ethnic
groups, assigning to each a cognizable claim on Afghan citizenship. Chapter
Two, outlining the Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens, constitutes the
largest section of the entire document with 37 articles. They include, inter alia,
the right to non-discrimination and equal rights (Article 22), a presumption of
innocence and a right to trial (Article 25), a prohibition on torture (Article 29),
the right to freedom of expression (Article 34) and association (Article 35), and
the right to property (Article 40). The constitution does not stop, however, at
procedural guarantees, but attempts to secure substantive goods as well, such as
the right to free education provided through university graduation (Article 43),
the promotion of women's education (Article 44), the right to vocational oppor-
tunities (Articles 46 and 48), the promotion of science and the arts (Article 47),
and the right to free health care (Article 52).
The 2004 edition of the Constitution further complicates the document's
political status in two ways. Article 7 requires the state to abide by the United
Nations Charter, all international legal instruments to which it is a party, and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 58 establishes the Independent
Human Rights Commission of Afghanistan with jurisdiction over all violations
of fundamental rights. These human rights provisions may not be as effective as
they seem, since the Islamic provisions, as demonstrated in the 1964
Constitution, tend to operate as automatic trumps, leaving the rights provisions
to serve more or less as window-dressing. However, what is potentially problem-
atic about the 2004 Constitution is the introduction of language giving legal
effect to international law and the formation of an independent commission pre-
sumably capable of giving such provisions force. Without these provisions, a
Supreme Court adjudicating a constitutional question would be able to dismiss a
traditional rights claim based on its conservative application of a particular
Islamic legal rule. But is the court allowed the same degree of leeway when it is
adjudicating, for example, the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, to which Afghanistan is a party? With Article 64 and its basic
"repugnancy" clause lurking in the background, it is difficult to say that the court
would be able to trump the UN Charter or the like just as it would an Afghan
law deemed unconstitutional. The constitution itself, unfortunately, offers no
guidance as to where the balance is to be struck, and the upshot appears to be
that while the new constitution offers more resistance in terms of Islamic co-
optation than the previous one did, only time will tell how much.
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Rites and Rights
Of less concern to groups like the Hazara than the relationship between
democracy and Islam has been the relationship between Islam and Islam. That is
to say, the Hazara have historically found themselves the targets of both sectarian
and ethnic discrimination by their Sunni neighbors and had hoped to find in the
provisions of the new constitution a religious remedy. On the sectarian front, this
meant either the removal of madhaab references altogether or the inclusion of a
provision putting Shi'i jurisprudence on par with the Hanafi. As mentioned
above, this largely amounted to the symbolic and identitarian interest in an
autonomous control over religious rituals. To this end, there has clearly been a
reduction in references to Hanafi, most explicitly with the excise of the old con-
stitution's mandated use of Hanafi for official state rites. While Hanafi remains
in Article 130, which may yet prove to be a
With a history of judicial tool of considerable leverage, Article
131 allows for Shi'i jurisprudence in per-
entrenched ethnic sonal matters, presumably of family and
fragmentation, one would inheritance law. It is impossible to predict
have expected something how these provisions will actually operate in
the scarred atmosphere of Afghan politics,
more substantial than two but at the very least groups like the
platitudinous articles [in Hazara-seeking affirmation through the
the Constitution]. validation of their madhaab on a level com-
parable to that of other groups-should
take some formal solace.
While the constitution may have made some headway in terms of rites, it
appears far more naive with respect to rights. Although there was some debate
over whether Afghanistan would adopt a federal or centralized system of gover-
nance, the Constitutional Commission ultimately went with a strong and cen-
tralized presidential power in Kabul. While it may not necessarily be accurate to
say that a federal structure would have been of greater benefit to the disaggregated
power base among groups and warlords, it does not appear that the constitution
was established with much of an eye towards multiethnic democracy and minor-
ity rights. Indeed, with a history of entrenched ethnic fragmentation, one would
have expected something more substantial than two platitudinous articles. Article
6 obliges the state to ensure national unity and equality among the ethnic groups
and balanced development throughout the country, while Article 4 simply lists
the groups comprising the nation of Afghanistan.32
These provisions must do battle, however, with the likes of Article 35,
which bars ethnicity as a permissible ground for forming a political party, and
Article 66, which prohibits the president from affirmative action based on lin-
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guistic, ethnic, religious, political, or regional considerations. These prohibitions
clearly emerge from the sentiment that Afghanistan as a nascent nation is to form
and progress on the basis of civic virtues and not ethnic cores." As Karzai stated
in a speech at the close of the January 2004 Loya Jirga, "Our vision for
Afghanistan is of a country where people relate to each other through reason and
shared ideas, convictions and behaviour, not through ethnic bonds, because this
is not the way of building nations."34
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM:
LIBERAL POLITICAL THEORY AND ISLAM
Quite explicitly, the 2004 Constitution attempts to achieve a structural
blend of liberal democratic and Islamic tenets, and a common complaint is that
this kind of blending cannot work." Although this section does not comprehen-
sively address this critique, it does reference the issues at stake in the debate. It
does so by outlining the place of neutrality in liberal political theory, and distin-
guishing the doctrine of minority rights from the basic non-discrimination norm.
This is helpful inasmuch as one wonders whether the classic liberal system that
has flourished in some parts of the world can readily be transplanted in the frag-
mented society of the Hazara. This parsing becomes especially important when
one considers that the constitution-a hybrid of Islam and liberalism-provides
no self-referential marks for when, in the case of a conflict, one theoretical plane
trumps the other.
Liberal Neutrality
Nineteenth century classic liberalism was fundamentally individualistic.36 It
was premised on an apparently primordial idea about the right of the individual
to set about defining his life in his own way. 7 Moral decision-making was a job
that fell squarely on his shoulders, and, as each person worked towards his own
benefit, social welfare naturally followed as the fruit of an invisible aggregation.
This individual's role in defining "the good life" meant that the state was confimed
to a neutral position with respect to such matters; government would certainly
outlaw harmful conduct, but would have little part to play in deciding what it
meant to lead a good life. This neutrality in the moral sphere tracked the legal
sphere, in which the law was to be applied equally and fairly to all without con-
sideration (at least in theory) to characteristics such as sex, race, and national
origin." Naturally, state neutrality begat an egalitarianism that served as a chas-
tening principle for individuals pursuing their own forms of the good life, but only
so long as everyone had an equal chance to do the same. This initial dynamic was
a thin one, and explicitly favored the libertarian impulse over the egalitarian one,
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allowing for constraints on liberty only in the narrowest of circumstances. 9 The
analogy for this relationship was the marketplace, in which it was the duty of the
state to maintain fair and equal procedures by which individuals could pursue
their variously constituted interests. °
The classic liberal spin on equality is therefore premised on a neutral state
committed to procedural egalitarianism.4 That is to say, equal rights should be
maintained by securing procedural guarantees for all people, on the one hand,
and an anti-perfectionist neutrality with respect to moral goods on the other. As
Robert Dahl has explained, liberal democracy at its heart is defined by a single
principle: "all the members [of the demos] are to be treated (under the
Constitution) as if they were equally qualified to participate in the process of
making decisions about the policies the association will pursue."42 In order for
political equality to be sustained, Dahl asserted, a democratic process must incor-
porate the following criteria: effective participation (with all members having an
equal chance to present their views), voting equality, enlightened understanding
(with all members having opportunities to learn about the issues on which they
are deliberating and voting), control of the agenda (such that policies on the
agenda are malleable and always susceptible to change by any of the members),
and adult inclusion (with all adult members having the full rights implied in the
previous four criteria).43
Procedural democracy of the early twentieth century emerged as a reified set
of relationships between the market, government, and civil society.44 Of course,
what had appeared natural to one generation proved troublesome to the next, and
in the wake of the Great Depression a new democratic project hoped to discipline
a truculent libertarianism. Having dispensed with grander visions in democratic
experimentalism for Keynesian tax-and-transfer programs, leftists settled on a
compromise that would eventually herald the arrival of the welfare state, and a
rather different idea of what "equality" meant in democratic governance.45 In con-
trast to the classic liberal conception, a "social" or "substantive" ideal developed
that considered it a duty to affirmatively further the interests of disadvantaged
groups and emphasized equality of outcome over procedural guarantees.46
Can Theocratic States Be Neutral?
Ultimately, it would seem that a theocratic form of constitutionalism,
whether Islamic or otherwise, is not very plausible. Any political order that
derives its authority from essentially nonpolitical sources-that is, God-is sub-
ject more to the whims of divine interpretation that it is limited by earthbound
constraints on the use of government or state power.47
Comparativist scholars Daniel Franklin and Michael Baun thus believe
"religious democracy" to be unworkable and, to be sure, they are hardly alone.48
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How can religious authority possibly sustain the neutrality necessary to ensure
the freedom of individuals to pursue their own ideas of the good life, when that
religious authority-which is also the state-has strictly defined moral concep-
tions? Despite the seemingly unassailable logic in this critique, there are a few
possible prima facie ways of challenging the complaint that Islamic
Constitutionalism is an oxymoron.
One argument is empirical, and it refers to the growing number of constitu-
tions in the Arab world: Islamic Constitutionalism is clearly plausible in that it is a
p roject in p ro gress, w ith lesser and greater ...........................................................................................................  
degrees of success. A second avenue contests
the limited vision in which Islam is viewed as ... There are a few
a monolithic entity defined by its most out- possible prima facie
spoken "fundamentalists." This argument ways of challenging the
entails an acceptance of liberal neutrality and
an attempt to fit Islam within liberalism's
broad embrace. 9 Modern Islam, this view Constitutionalism
would suggest, embodies a tradition of plu- is an oxymoron.
ralism and equality, and can easily find
within its doctrinal basis the capacity for rea-
soned, non-capricious, rights-based judgments. There is no disputing the fact that
Islam has a moral concept, but there is no reason to believe that such a concept
would ineluctably lead to its imposition on members of the demo&
A third argument questions the coherence of the neutrality principle in the
first place. What barrier could neutrality realistically claim to have against Islam
if neutrality turned out to be a sham? Liberal neutrality might be attacked from
any number of directions, but two of them include the critical legal5° and "cul-
turalist" approaches.5" Critical legal theory has for many years exposed liberal pre-
suppositions in the law as decidedly status quo and far more subjectively
ideological than objectively neutral. It is a liberal fantasy, such an argument
posits, to believe that adjudication of the law and the act of legislation are distinct
projects, the former strictly legal and the latter political. Laws are ideological and
favor certain segments of society, as do the structures that purport to equally bal-
ance such laws between citizens and the state. Not only does the discourse or
method of adjudication in a liberal society favor status quo ideologies, the very
structure of form and process colors the substance of the law as well.
From a different direction comes the culturalist attack on liberal neutral-
ity. This argument suggests that the liberal state has traditionally viewed culture
in the same way that it has viewed religion-with benign neglect. 2 This is to say
that the neutrality described above is taken further in the realm of religion, where
liberal democracies do not only turn a blind eye, but actively enforce a strict sep-
aration of church and state. It follows that the liberal state would view culture in
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the same way, refraining from promoting any one culture above another through
legitimating processes, yet allowing for the free expression of all. In this way, the
burden of proof in liberal theory falls with the religion, culture, or morality to
show why it is that the neutral position of the state should be disturbed by pref-
erential policies.
The culturalist argument asserts, however, that a diagnosis of actual policy in
almost any liberal state will expose "this idea that liberal-democratic states are indif-
ferent to ethnocultural identities [as] manifestly false... [and that] the religion model
is altogether misleading as an account of the relationship between the liberal-demo-
cratic state and ethnocultural groups."53 Liberal states intentionally and deliberately
promote a "societal culture" of tightly interconnected policies and programs that
inform citizens as to what language they need to speak and what institutions they
are to serve if they are to successfully integrate. 4 Liberal "neutrality" thus collapses
into a process of liberal nation-building: Liberal states de facto encourage citizens
to view their chances of achieving the good life as intimately tied up with partici-
pation within the state's institutional framework and its practices.55
If it is true that theocratic democracy is unworkable because it is rooted in
the caprice of divine interpretation, it would seem that one would have the
burden of showing how this is meaningfully different from the caprice borne of
nation-building. The reason divinity is attacked as arbitrary is that it presumably
lies disconnected from the rule of law, neutrally positioned as an arbiter and adju-
dicator. If the nationalist and critical legal arguments are correct, however, liberal
neutrality is a facade, masquerading for precisely the same type of capricious deci-
sion-making theocracies are accused of committing. It may be that this line of
thinking leads to a "two wrongs don't make a right," and that very well may be.
The point, however, is that Islamic Constitutionalism should not be dismissed
for failing a standard that in all probability, no liberal democracy has ever met.
Equal Rights vs. Minority Rights
Moving from the more general and abstract relationship between liberal
theory and Islam to the case of the Hazara, it is well worth knowing how the two
fields view the rights with which minority groups should be endowed. As for lib-
eralism, minority rights have had a hard time finding a place for at least three rea-
sons. One is that minority rights appear to require rights that belong to groups,
rather than individuals.56 This violates the liberal premise that the individual is
the primary unit of analysis. A second problem, perhaps related to the first, is that
minority rights have not historically been very popular, only making their way to
prominence in the 1990s. 7 A third problem is the one identified above, that the
idea of minority rights conceivably poses a threat to the nation-building projects
of liberal democracies.
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Problems aside, doctrinally, minority rights should be distinguished from
general civil liberties entrenched in documents like the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights or the U.S. Bill of Rights. As a subcommission of the United
Nations Economic and Social Council (UNESCO) explained, equal protection
doctrine differs from minority rights in that the latter seeks:
Protection of non-dominant groups which, while wishing in general for
equality of treatment with the majority, wish for a measure of differential
treatment in order to preserve basic characteristics which they possess and
which distinguish them from the majority of the population.5"
Where the melting pot has been replaced by the mosaic, minority rights
seek to actively sustain the viability of separate national, cultural, religious, and
linguistic traditions. This affirmative approach necessitates eschewing blind jus-
tice in favor of a discriminating justice and multicultural democracy, and it goes
beyond a general integration norm. The goal in minority rights doctrine is not
necessarily integration, but instead viability, sustainability, and autonomy.
There are a number of international and regional instruments dedicated to
minority rights protection, and some appear more successfully situated than
others. For present purposes, a glance at the United Nations Minorities
Declaration and the Council of Europe's Framework Convention on Minority
Rights will be sufficient to get a sense of what such rights generally look like.
The Minorities Declaration" consists of nine articles and stylistically fol-
lows the individualistic orientation in Article 27 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights.' The Minorities Declaration underscores the
importance of cultural, religious, and linguistic independence in Article 2, fram-
ing these rights in a positive way by using the phrase "have the right to" as
opposed to "shall not be denied the right to." This elaboration goes on to spell
out rights to effectively participate in cultural, religious, social, economic, and
public life.6 Article Three provides that the rights of minorities may be exercised
individually as well as in community and that no disadvantage shall result from
either their exercise or non-exercise. Article 4 places a number of substantive
obligations on states, including the duty "to create favourable conditions to
enable persons belonging to minorities to express their characteristics and to
develop their culture, language, religion, traditions, and customs, except where
specific practices are in violation of national law and contrary to international
standards;" "to take adequate opportunities to learn their mother tongue or to
have instruction in their mother tongue;" and "to consider appropriate measures
so that persons belonging to minorities may participate fully in the economic
progress and development in their country."
Articles 5, 6, and 7 deal with the obligation of states to plan and imple-
ment national policies and programs that will cater to the interests of minorities
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and emphasize the need for international cooperation. Article 8 sets about plac-
ing the rights previously mentioned in their international context, providing that
its exercise should not collide with the right to equality found in other instru-
ments like the Universal Declaration or other duties articulated in various treaty
obligations. Article 9 provides that the United Nations and its specialized agen-
cies shall contribute towards "full realization" of the Minority Rights
Declaration. The focal point for minority rights work at the United Nations is
now the Working Group on Minorities, created by the Sub-Commission in 1995
to help in the implementation process of the Declaration.
A regional example of a minority rights instrument is the Council of
Europe's Framework Convention on Minority Rights, adopted by its Committee
of Ministers in 1995 and entered into force in 1998.6" The Framework Convention
had been in the works since 1949, the first year of the Council's existence, in which
the Parliamentary Assembly recognized the importance of wider protection for
Inspired by the religious
compulsion ofjihad, as well
as the plunder and slaves
promised by subjugation of






minorities.63 It was initially suggested that
this protection take the form of an additional
article in the European Convention on
Human Rights that could focus on minority
rights, but after years of discussion and delay,
the Parliamentary Assembly assigned the task
of drawing up a convention on minority
rights to the Steering Committee on Human
Rights in 1991 .'
The Framework Convention sets out
a programmatic prescription for states that
highlights, in a "spirit of good faith," a
number of obligations that the drafters
intended to appear more as a set of progres-
sive goal-oriented objectives than negative
prohibitions. The Convention underscores,
inter alia, that the protection of minorities exceeds the powers of any one state
and is a problem for international cooperation, the individualistic orientation of
minority rights, the right of equality, and the right to equal protection before the
law, in addition to the right to freedom of language, assembly, religion, trans-
frontier and intercultural dialogue, and education. Article 15 again addresses the
question of political participation, asserting, "The Parties shall create the condi-
tions necessary for the effective participation of persons belonging to national
minorities in cultural, social and economic life and in public affairs, in particular
those affecting them."65
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Minority Rights in Islam
Unfortunately, it is no easy thing to describe "minority rights in Islam."
The description cannot accurately begin at any one point, as the answer will
depend on which Islamic voice the author finds most compelling. This panoply
is partially a product of Islam's lack of a centralized ecclesiastical authority, and
so there are many views within Islam as to the protections minorities should be
afforded, none of which preeminate above the rest. Another problem involves the
structure of Islamic law itself: the laws of the state spelling out the rights and
duties of citizens necessarily involve the public law administration of the state, an
area traditionally left by Islam to the ruler's discretion. This implicates the dis-
tinction betweenfiqh and siyasa (the principles and practices left to the discre-
tionary and circumstantial powers of the ruler). 6 Of course, this discretionary
power was meant to be rooted in Islam, and Islamic jurists have historically made
attempts at expanding the zones offiqh over siyasa.
In spite of these problems, this section will try to find the Islamic voice(s).
As a threshold matter, there are two ways of thinking about minority rights in
Islam in the abstract. The first is the extent to which Muslim minorities in non-
Muslim states must follow Islamic law. This has long been a hotly contested
question, dating back to the Middle Ages,67 and involves the conceptual realm of
dar al-Islam (the domain of Islam) and dar al-harb (a state ruled by non-
Muslims) or dar al-kufr.68 Muslims residing within dar al-Islam are obliged to live
under Islamic law, both in its private and public manifestations. What happens,
however, when a Muslim is living in dar al-harb?
The second way of thinking about minority rights in the Islamic context
concerns Muslim majorities and the protections that Islamic law affords both sec-
tarian and religious minorities living in a Muslim-majority state. While it may
appear at first glance that these two perspectives are quite distinct, the complex-
ities of the first invariably infect the way that Muslims have thought about the
protections they can faithfully afford non-Muslims living in their own territories.
After all, if Islam commands the legal supremacy of its own legal system, is there
not the potential of a contradiction in allowing for a pluralistic vision of religious
freedoms in an Islamic state?
The traditional view on minority rights tends toward answering this ques-
tion in the affirmative, and typically begins by distinguishing between Muslims,
People of the Book, and non-Muslims.69 The People of the Book (ahlal-kitab) have
scriptures, are monotheistic, and are typically understood as being the Jews and
Christians. In the traditional understanding, Jews and Christians were obviously
non-Muslim, and thereby non-believers. Their status as dhimmis (protected peo-
ples), however, ensured the security of their person and property, their religious
freedom to the extent that it did not violate the rules of the Muslim state, and a
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degree of communal autonomy. These freedoms were provided in exchange for a
poll-tax (izyh), which signified a tribute by the dhimmi to the Muslim ruler.
Dhimmis were prohibited from both holding leadership positions over Muslims
and prosyletizing their faith. This latter issue makes sense considering the Islamic
law of apostasy, which forbids any Muslim from recanting his beliefs.7"
The upshot of these principles is a rights regime with very little leeway.
Few protections are offered non-Muslims, especially those without scriptures,
and as regards sectarian differences, the rules for determining the legitimacy of
theological boundaries have been thin at best. Relatively speaking, medieval
Islamic governance was often identifiable for its leniency with regard to ethnic,
religious, and sectarian minorities. When Islam was introduced to India in the
fourteenth century, for example, Hindus were regularly treated as dhimmi and, as
long as they paid taxes to the Muslim sultanate, were allowed religious free-
doms.7' A pluralistic Islamic governance structure was the result, with various
types of Muslim practice operating alongside Hindus, Jews, and Christians. This
Mughal pluralism in India reached its peak under Akbar (1556-1605), who
repealed all aspects of Islamic law discriminating against religious minorities. Not
only did Akbar allow for Hindus to build new temples, but he also abrogated
apostasy laws and the jizyh. This liberalism extended to the Shi'a as well, who
were at the time experiencing heavy persecution by the Ottomans.72
The Ottoman Empire was also quite amenable to ethnic and religious
minorities. As the empire included a vast number of such peoples, the Ottoman
rulers implemented a pragmatic policy of self-government through their millet
system, allowing for minority leaders to rule their communities in accordance
with their own courts, laws, customs, and religious practices. As Antony Black
has written, "Such ethnic and creedal diversity was a continuation of the 'tribal'
policy of the first Ottomans" as well as the "Islamic emphasis on creed rather
than race."" These allowances were largely political, however, and a function of
running a multiethnic, multi-religious empire. This liberality was not all-inclu-
sive: it did not include the Shi'a, who at that time dominated the hostile Safavid
empire, and it did not protect ethnic and religious minorities when it was polit-
ically expedient to violate their rights. As Black notes, an example of deterrent
punishment within the Ottoman Empire "was when, after the murder of a
Muslim household, some 800 non-Muslim vagrants were rounded up and exe-
cuted."
74
In the modern era, the rights of Muslim sectarian minorities within Islamic
states are protected more on the basis of country-specific decisions than strict
universal rules of Islamic law. Pakistan, for example, has long experienced prob-
lems with both the Shi'a and Ahmadis." Pakistan's Constitution does, however,
have noteworthy language for the prospects of such sects:
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All existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the Injunctions of
Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah, in this Part referred to
as the Injunctions of Islam, and no law shall be enacted which is repugnant
to such Injunctions. [Footnote 242 reads:] Explanation: In the application
of this clause to the personal law of any Muslim sect, the expression "Quran and
Sunnah" shall mean the Quran and Sunnah as interpreted by that sect.
(emphasis added)76
Pakistan thus allows for Shi'i fiqh to govern their personal legal matters.
Other Islamic states dominated by Sunnis, like Oman,77 Egypt," and even Saudi
Arabia,79 are similarly agnostic on the question of whether particular sects should
be constitutionally mandated. While the constitutions of these states are all
Islamic, they refrain from specificity beyond that.
Despite this absence of codified treatment, there is, nonetheless, a great deal
of de facto concern attending the plight of Muslim minorities in Muslim states.8" A
number of Islamic scholars have attempted to resurrect the pluralism extant within
pre-modern Islamic systems as standing in contradistinction to what they perceive
as the fundam entally un-Islam ic Islam ic fun- • ......................................... . ........ .... ..... .... .
damentalism of today. This would not mean, Does liberalism pose
however, going back to a millet system of reli-
gious autonomies. Fathi Osman, for example, greater promise for
has argued that contemporary Islam is not minority rights than an
only pluralistic in and of itself, but is also Islamic perspective?
amenable to religious freedom in general. He
writes, "Each group should have the rights to
organize and develop, to maintain its identity and interests, and each should enjoy
equality of rights and obligations in the state and in the world."8' Abdullahi An-
Naim has also written extensively on not only the need but also the propitiousness
of realizing Islam's true perspective on equality and human rights.82
Does liberalism pose greater promise for minority rights than an Islamic
perspective? From the preceding discussion it is clear enough that it is quite hard
to say. One problem is that liberal states have a rough track record of their own
with respect to minority rights, only having come to seriously consider the matter
in the 1990s. The minority rights project is therefore a young one. Another prob-
lem is that, at least on the liberal culturalist view, liberal states are often directly
threatening to minority cultures due to the latent and backgrounded promotion
of certain languages, religions, and social mores. From the Islamic side, it appears
that Islam might be considerate to minority needs, but the question very much
turns on which brand of Islam a state happens to implement. Liberal democracies
and Islamic states both have the wherewithal for minority rights protection, both
theoretically and as a matter of practice. It boils down to a matter of political will.
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CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion has sought to highlight the contours of the
debate on whether Islamic Constitutionalism is either at theoretical loggerheads
or simply a bad idea when it comes to protecting minority groups. In the first
case, it seems like a bad faith argument to insist that Islamic Constitutionalism
cannot work because Islam, as a theological entity, by definition prescribes a
moral code and thus cannot match the neutrality so important to liberal democ-
racies. This seems an unfair criticism because Islam's relationship with pluralism
is a work in progress, and at least in the view of some prominent Muslims, Islam
is indeed capable of achieving a pluralistic state. It also may be a bad faith argu-
ment if one is persuaded by the claim that liberal neutrality has never worked in
the first place. There also appears to be substantial room for argument as to
whether Islamic Constitutionalism is a patently bad idea for minority rights.
There are weighty traditions within Islam guaranteeing both religious and ethnic
diversity, and while some Islamic strains have not proved as friendly as others,
there is no lack of examples in "liberal" states of practices hostile to minority
interests.
This article has also attempted to examine Islamic Constitutionalism in
Afghanistan from the perspective of the Hazara. This has entailed a two-part
analysis that has asked whether Islam can co-exist with a healthy democratic
experimentalism despite its alleged inability to maintain neutral governance and
a pluralistic politics safe for minorities. It began by first outlining the history of
the Hazara in Afghanistan and the perennial difficulties they have faced because
of their ethnicity and religion. Emerging from this background, the Hazara have
fought for sectarian freedoms and affirmative action on the part of the state,
which would develop their educational and vocational deficits.
On the sectarian side, the Hazara complaint is complicated by the fact that
they are Muslims seeking religious freedom in a state where Islam is the official
religion. The lines are muddied between the rights that would ordinarily inhere
for non-Muslims, and the rights of minority Muslim sects against the Muslim
majority. Ann Mayer has written:
When a state imposes an ideologized version of Islam, Muslims who dis-
sent from this version may be effectively relegated to a subcategory where
they are exposed to discrimination similar to that meted out to non-
Muslims and where they are subjected to mistreatment that may at times
be even more severe, because the regime may feel directly threatened by
their challenges to the official orthodoxy. 3
Despite this, the 2004 Constitution may prove adequate insofar as the
largely symbolic problem of rites language has been excised. The ethnic question,
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however, received equivocal treatment, and where it is raised, it is done so in a
manner that may damage minority rights. Taking Karzai's comments as illustra-
tive of the general move away from an explicit multicultural governance scheme,
it should be pointed out that emphases on civic unity have been tried and have
failed in Afghanistan before. Further problems creep in as the liberal culturalist
argument gathers force: will the central push towards an "Afghan nation" mas-
querade as a nation-building exercise in which the historically disadvantaged foot
the bill? Thus, the Hazara may have gained ground with respect to religious rit-
uals and the applicability of Shi'i law to familial matters, but, along with other
minority groups, have failed to the extent that they have sought minority pro-
tections above the basic, liberal, individualist non-discrimination norm.
This deficiency has been targeted by practitioners who see in Afghanistan
a conglomeration of tribes tied by bonds of kinship with highly segmented cul-
tural allegiances. As explained above, a liberal focus on non-discrimination
simply misses the mark when the structural problems of multiculturalism loom
in the background, constantly threatening the stability of the system. There is
hardly a better example than Afghanistan, perpetually poised for balkanization. m
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